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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses both the conditions under which resilience in areas of 
limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) can be fostered and the 
potential contributions by the EU and its member states. Drawing on EU-
LISTCO’s conceptual framework, the paper defines the analytical category of 
resilience and provides a roadmap to study its characteristics in 
configurations of ALS and CO. In fact, it applies – and further problematizes 
– such concepts to the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. It formulates a 
number of general hypotheses about how resilience can be fostered in these 
contexts, highlighting its historically contingent and context-specific nature, 
discussing how external actors could contribute in fostering resilience. These 
sets of hypotheses are meant to provide a roadmap for – and be tested in – 
subsequent EU-LISTCO empirical enquiries. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the release of the European Union’s Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016, resilience-
building became the new guiding principle for the EU’s foreign and security policy 
in the EU’s neighbourhoods. Resilience is defined as “the ability of states and 
societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external 
crisis,” and the EU commits to “support different paths to resilience to its east and 
south, focusing on the most acute dimensions of fragility and targeting those where 
we can make a meaningful difference” (European Union 2016: 9, 25). By focusing on 
the capacities of existing structures, the EU aims to contribute to stable governance 
arrangements in its neighbourhood that are able to deter potential security threats to 
the EU. The new resilience paradigm may lead to substantial changes in EU foreign 
and security policies, thus potentially impacting the relationship between the EU and 
its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods (EN and SN respectively), as well as with 
the ‘neighbourhood of the neighbourhood’ (Bendiek 2017; Juncos 2017; Wagner and 
Anholt 2016). 
The concept of resilience has received substantial academic and policy attention, 
quickly evolving into a key concept across international policymaking for 
development, foreign, and security policies. Different fields of research define 
resilience differently and relate it to different social systems (Walklate et al. 2013; 
Bahadur et al. 2010). The security-oriented literature conceptualises resilience as a 
condition of safety to be reached by protecting critical infrastructure and devising 
measures of emergency response (Boin and McConnell 2007; Brasset and Vaughan-
Williams 2015; Kaufmann 2015; Manea 2017). The psychological and sociological 
literature focuses on the capacities of individuals and societies to cope with disasters 
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and risks (Aldrich and Meyer 2014; Bonß 2015; Endreß and Rampp 2015; Wilson 2015). 
In the development-oriented literature, resilience is conceptualised as an antidote to 
social vulnerabilities in the shape of conditions and capacities for establishing 
sustainable political processes and enabling economic development (Adger et al. 
2011; Barett and Constas 2014; Bernier and Meinzen-Dick 2014; Gelbard et al. 2015; 
Harrison and Chiroro 2017; Ryan 2012). Moreover, there are various critical 
perspectives on resilience which suggest that resilience is a policy concept that 
promotes neoliberal governmentality and therefore tends to mask societal 
inequalities (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010; Mckeown and Glenn 2017). Taking 
account of these debates, the EU-LISTCO consortium seeks to better define resilience 
and the conditions under which it can be fostered in EN and SN countries affected by 
areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO), as well as the potential 
contributions of the EU and its member states (Börzel and Risse 2018). 
This paper presents EU-LISTCO’s approach to resilience and strengthening resilience 
in ALS/CO in the SN and EN, linking the conceptual debate to the regional debate and 
focusing on the implications of both for empirical research. The first section 
translates the broad policy concept of resilience into an analytical category and 
provides a roadmap to study its characteristics in configurations of ALS and CO, 
formulating a number of general hypotheses about how resilience can be fostered in 
these contexts. In doing so, it argues that the stable social and political conditions 
that external actors must aim for to foster resilience are historically contingent and 
context specific. Relatedly, the second and third sections contextualize and adjust the 
analytical framework in light of the specific ALS and CO dynamics prevailing in the 
EN and SN, refining and complementing the general hypotheses. The hypotheses 
formulated in the paper are meant to provide a roadmap for – and be tested in – 
subsequent EU-LISTCO empirical enquiries. 
2. RESILIENCE IN ALS/CO 
Focusing on collective capacities rather than on individual capacities, EU-LISTCO 
conceptualises resilience as the ability of societies to manage opportunities and 
contain risks emanating from ALS/CO (Börzel and Risse 2018). The consortium 
focuses on resilience in the form of adaptive capacities of societies as “their ability to 
learn from past experiences and adjust themselves to future challenges” and 
transformative capacities as “their ability to craft sets of institutions that foster 
individual welfare and sustainable societal robustness towards future crises” (Keck 
and Sakdapolrak 2013: 5). As opposed to mere coping, resilience as adaptability and 
transformability involves medium or high levels of change, with a view to the 
present and future well-being of the society. 
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2.1 Resilience of What? Societal Resilience in ALS/CO 
EU-LISTCO argues that resilience needs to be distinguished from general system 
stability. Stability is the capacity of a system to persist or to ‘bounce back’. However, 
as regimes and their public institutions in ALS/CO can be deeply dysfunctional, 
neglectful of human rights, and resistant to change, they are not necessarily the 
backbone of a resilient society (Biscop 2016: 2). Indeed, in some countries in the EU’s 
neighbourhood, citizens at times need to be resilient against their own governments 
(Grevi 2016; Techau 2016). 
EU-LISTCO’s research will not focus on the resilience of regimes or system stability. 
Instead, it focuses on societal resilience as a precondition for effective governance 
arrangements that provide goods and services to the society. Understood as a 
process, societal resilience means that social units constantly engage in managing 
risks, including information gathering, resource mobilization, capacity building, and 
leadership. These processes need to be backed up by law enforcement and societal 
mechanisms for conflict resolution, which require a corresponding institutional 
structure (Carabine and Wilkinson 2016). Importantly, societal resilience comprises 
important elements of relationship resilience between the social unit and the 
corresponding institutional structure. As noted by Jones and Chandran (2008), it is 
neither just the society nor the state (or the institutional structure) that needs to be 
resilient. Rather, the social contract between the two needs to be included in the 
analysis. 
In ALS/CO, the corresponding institutional structure need not necessarily be the 
state and its institutions. Instead, functional equivalents to modern statehood may 
regularly provide collective goods and services to at least parts of the society (Draude 
2007). Functional equivalents in ALS/CO can be traditional authorities, religious 
leaders, warlords, rebel groups, development agencies, international organizations, 
or companies, etc. (Risse et al. 2018). Hence, EU-LISTCO will take the resilience of both 
state institutions and non-state governance institutions into account where they are 
pertinent for the resilience of societies. 
2.2 Resilience to What? Risks Emanating from ALS/CO 
EU-LISTCO analyses risks emanating from ALS/CO, which can be of regional, global 
and diffuse character, and of domestic or external origin (Magen et al. 2019). The 
most pertinent risks are those that could trigger governance breakdowns and violent 
conflict. While being sources of risks, ALS/CO only turn into security threats to the 
EU and its member states if they deteriorate into governance breakdown and violent 
conflict. 
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2.3 Implications for the Case Study Templates 
Societal resilience can pertain to different social units; for example, households, 
communities, and societies. The national level may be the right unit of analysis, but 
it is not by default. Indeed, in many countries in the EN and SN, the sub-national 
(local/district) level may be a more appropriate unit of analysis for exploring micro-
processes and techniques that are related to societal resilience (Joseph 2014). For the 
empirical analysis of resilience, the research templates need to determine collective 
units of analysis, comprising specifications for the respective territory and 
timeframe for the analysis. These units can be located at the local, national or 
regional level, as long as they comprise clear boundaries of what is considered 
internal and external.  
3. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE EU AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES 
External actors who wish to strengthen resilience in ALS/CO need to define the 
objectives of their interventions and identify factors conducive to reaching these 
objectives. The EU and its various member states have differing approaches to 
fostering resilience (Bargués-Pedreny et al. 2019). The following section discusses 
how to strengthen resilience in contexts affected by ALS/CO that can lead to 
governance breakdown and violent conflict, and outlines some implications for the 
research templates.  
3.1 Strengthening Resilience in ALS/CO 
EU-LISTCO proceeds on the assumption that strengthening resilience does not equal 
the preservation and protection of a political or social system as a whole against 
external influences. Strengthening resilience needs to be distinguished from 
stabilization as the preservation of political and social order in situations of crisis 
and rapid change. Neither is strengthening resilience limited to decreasing the 
negative effects of risks emanating from ALS/CO. 
Rather, external actors need to determine the multiple political and social conditions 
in a community that are desirable and then contribute to stabilizing these conditions. 
Desirable conditions are conditions that preserve the ‘centre of gravity’ of the 
community in terms of functionality, structure, and identity (Endreß and Rampp 
2015: 49). The centre of gravity is closely related to the respective governance system 
of the social unit. However, this centre of gravity will continuously develop and 
change in view of current risks and opportunities. Moreover, in ALS/CO, where 
societies are often fragmented, there cannot be a ‘final end condition’ that is ideal for 
all members of the society (Pospisil and Besancenot 2014: 618). As Bahadur et al. 
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(2010: 3) note, strengthening resilience should not be considered as “restoring 
equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to which they should return 
after a disturbance”. What is more, the sources of resilience of one community can be 
causally related to the sources of vulnerability and risks of another. Hence, ‘desirable 
conditions’ need to be contextualised “with respect to their historicity or their 
dependence on specific temporal, spatial and social contexts and the parameters of 
their genesis” (Endreß 2015: 538). 
For strengthening resilience, external contributions need to focus on strengthening 
existing structures. These structures need to be embedded in the society already and 
cannot be ‘built’ (Menkhaus 2012). As opposed to simple governance contributions 
(e.g., oral vaccinations), strengthening existing structures performing more complex 
governance tasks is a long-term endeavour (Krasner and Risse 2014). External 
contributions cannot be limited to short-term, project-based livelihood assistance 
(Ryan 2012).  
Moreover, external actors should carefully weigh how far they should aim at 
strengthening the society’s capacities for persistence (coping capacities) or for 
change (adaptive/transformative capacities). Besides, to be effective, the respective 
target societal capacities need to be identified as conducive to resilience ex ante, 
while actual capacities to withstand risks and threats can only be assessed in 
retrospect (Endreß 2015). 
Ideally, external actors’ measures to strengthen resilience should be conducted 
before a tipping point has been reached where an ALS/CO becomes governance 
breakdown and violent conflict. Regardless of the pervasiveness of ALS/CO, there 
will always be a certain level of resilience attached to at least parts of the society, 
which external actors can strengthen. Such measures are not a management tool for 
imminent crisis but have a preventive character (Van Metre 2014: 4). However, 
resilience strengthening can also take place in the aftermath of governance 
breakdown and violent conflict.  
3.2  Strengthening Resilience after Governance Breakdown and 
Violent Conflict 
When societies have experienced situations of overextension and/or physical and 
mental overload resulting from governance breakdown and/or violent conflict, they 
require the capacities to transition into a new post-conflict setting without relapsing 
into violence. This transition requires societal members to undergo fundamental 
change processes at a point at which the level of resilience in the society is at its 
weakest (De Carvalho et al. 2014; De Coning 2016; Menkhaus 2012). Sources of societal 
resilience are particularly crucial for these change processes to unfold peacefully. 
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Under these conditions, measures for strengthening resilience will focus on social 
trust-building, addressing grievances fairly, and supporting a new vision for the 
local governance system (Menkhaus 2012). Regarding strengthening domestic 
institutions, measures will focus more on reconstruction than on reform. The 
distinct conditions for strengthening resilience after governance breakdown and 
violent conflict are considered separately in Section 4. 
3.3 Implications for the Case Study Templates 
Research templates should consider as paramount two reference points of ‘desirable 
conditions’ which external actors can aim at to strengthen resilience: 
 Citizens having adequate access to goods and services provided by the 
corresponding institutional structure; 
 Consent to the public order being in place and supported by key parts of the 
society (Pospisil and Besancenot 2014). 
4. CONDITIONS FOR FOSTERING RESILIENCE IN ALS/CO 
In order to determine the potential contributions of the EU and its members states to 
strengthen resilience in its neighbourhoods, conditions need to be identified under 
which resilience can be fostered. EU-LISTCO case studies will not cover all 
hypotheses and questions discussed below but will select only those most 
appropriate to the given cases. 
4.1 Social Trust 
Social trust is a personal attitude that determines how an individual interacts with 
other individuals and institutions. It is conducive for participation as well as the 
building of new norms (Aldrich 2012). EU-LISTCO understands social trust as “a 
cooperative attitude towards other people based on the optimistic expectation that 
others are likely to respect one’s own interests” (Draude et al. 2018: 354; see also 
Börzel and Risse [2016]). In ALS/CO, social trust amongst local populations means 
that they can develop collective action capacities and a culture of cooperation 
regardless of the functioning of remaining state structures (Gambetta 1988). The 
ability to act collectively and cooperatively is an important component of resilience, 
as it helps communities to quickly recover from the negative effects of risks in a 
coordinated manner and actively prevent governance breakdown and violent 
conflict. It can also limit the transaction costs of related actions (Bahadur et al. 2010). 
EU-LISTCO focuses on both the amount of group trust and on how people feel about 
the social trust directed towards the group. 
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Horizontally, social trust can take the shape of bonds between societal members or 
bridges between members from different communities (Putnam et al. 2004). Social 
trust can connect families and communities to their home territories and facilitate 
the sharing of knowledge and joint approaches to organizing daily lives in the 
presence of violence/crime. Social trust facilitates the emergence of shared identities 
and community solidarity that may span different constituencies (economic, 
political, and cultural networks), e.g., in efforts to exclude violent actors (Imbusch 
2015). However, social trust can also lead to societal fragmentation if it fosters in-
group favouritism (Hammond and Axelrod 2006), thereby limiting the capacity for 
collective action to a certain group and excluding others. One important source of in-
group favouritism is inequality. As well as economic and political inequalities in the 
society (vertical inequalities), inequalities between groups (horizontal inequalities) 
can also increase acceptance of and support for violence and the likelihood of 
conflict (Bartusevicius 2014), and perceptions of such inequality as unfair are at least 
as important as actual inequality here (Rustad 2016). Hence, social trust supports 
resilience only if it is non-exclusive and based on shared trust experiences or 
prosocial values (Börzel and Risse 2016).  
Vertically, trust can also be directed towards institutions. Trust in institutions arises 
from experiences of fair and transparent interactions between citizens and 
institutions that lead citizens to assume that these institutions are trustworthy and 
reliable (Börzel and Risse 2016). Trust relations between citizens and the police/other 
(non-state) security providers are particularly crucial in ALS/CO, as those actors may 
play a key role in triggering or preventing violent conflict. 
4.1.1 Strengthening Social Trust 
Social trust is an important access point for external actors to contribute to 
strengthening resilience in ALS/CO. As trust is based on the individual’s positive 
experiences of cooperation, it can be influenced by enabling such experiences, but is 
also easily disappointed by negative ones.  
External actors can foster social trust through strengthening the inclusiveness of 
social identities and promoting continuous exchange between communities 
(horizontal trust) as well as strengthening the fairness and transparency of 
institutions (vertical trust). Measures can involve incentives for community 
participation, creation of local institutions, design of infrastructure, and use of new 
technologies (Aldrich 2012). In ALS/CO, fostering positive experience should 
certainly involve police and/or other (non-state) security providers, but might also 
include civil society and business (Davis 2012). 
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4.1.2 Implications for Case Study Templates 
Hypotheses: 
Societies are more likely to manage opportunities and contain risks 
emanating from ALS/CO if they have high levels of  
(i) social trust and  
(ii) trust in institutions 
Related issue areas/questions: 
 To what extent have societal members shared ideas and narratives of desirable 
living conditions and good social order? What ideal conditions do they envisage? 
 To what extent is the society characterised by (group) inequalities? 
 Is there personalised trust among people living in the same neighbourhood/ 
community? 
 Is there group-based/particularistic trust in the society, and is it used for 
providing governance? If yes, which parts of the society are included/excluded? 
 Is there generalised trust which facilitates governance provision beyond local 
communities? 
 To what extent do key local actors and institutions (police, judges, teachers, 
doctors, and religious/traditional leaders) implement their governance function 
according to principles of fairness and transparency? 
 Do these actors and institutions enjoy trust which endows them with the 
capacities to become ‘agents of change’? 
After governance breakdown/violent conflict: 
 To what extent have social networks been disrupted? Are social support systems 
still in place (Norris et al. 2008)? 
 Do certain groups hold grievances against other parts of the population? 
 Do remaining trust relationships feature a strong discrimination of insiders and 
outsiders? 
 How has the migration/displacement/death of community members impacted 
social trust? 
 Do people feel a sense of belonging that motivates them to rebuild the 
infrastructure and social networks of a community (Norris et al. 2008)? 
4.2 Appropriate Institutional Design 
The ability of social systems to deal with risks substantially depends on their 
institutions, not least because those institutions manage the society’s politics and 
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resources (Joseph 2014). These institutions can be located at the local, domestic, and 
regional levels and consist of formal and informal, state and non-state institutions. 
Communities are more resilient if the institutional structure enables community 
voices to be included in relevant policy processes (Bahadur et al. 2010). These 
conditions are met if institutions are open, inclusive, and able to channel societal 
dissent in a non-violent, negotiated manner (Bahadur et al. 2010; Ryan 2012). 
Moreover, it is crucial for the resilience of a society that the institutional design of 
the governance arrangement providing goods and services is effective and ‘fit for 
purpose’ (Risse and Stollenwerk 2018a). In ALS/CO, fit for purpose means that the 
institutional structure has the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and to 
sustain its operations and functionality when confronted with risks and threats (De 
Coning 2016). Flexibility facilitates institutional learning from situations of 
risk/threat exposure and innovation to adjust to future risks/threats (Carabine and 
Wilkinson 2016). 
On the one hand, flexibility can be achieved through decentralization (Bahadur et al. 
2010). Decentralised institutions can connect marginalised communities with 
governance providers and facilitate information and resource exchange between the 
capital and peripheries (top-down/bottom-up). Decentralised institutions are also 
more likely to provide opportunities for local participation and self-organization. In 
ALS/CO, the quality of institutions and their service provision at the local level is 
particularly pertinent. In the absence of national institutions, local governance 
institutions can contribute to the prevention of governance breakdown and violent 
conflict (Wig and Tollefsen 2016).  
On the other hand, flexibility can also involve risk-spreading mechanisms. For 
example, higher governance levels can support local governance systems at times 
when they struggle to deal with risks (Algicia and Tarko 2014). Moreover, overlaps in 
the functions of governance systems enable cross-level interactions – i.e., if one 
system fails, another can take over. These overlaps can also be situated between the 
national and the regional level (e.g., regional security architectures). They contribute 
to the preparedness and planning capacities of societies in times of increased 
risk/threat exposure (Bahadur et al. 2010). Such overlaps require institutions to 
cooperate with each other to be able to implement more complex governance tasks. 
4.2.1 Strengthening Appropriate Institutional Design 
Institutions are good access points for external support, as they can provide angles to 
make resource allocations to the society more open and inclusive. In societies 
confronted with a high level of risk, measures of justice and equity are especially 
important when the tasks of coping with these risks are distributed within the 
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society (Bahadur et al. 2010). Measures can involve capacity development for 
adaptive and effective resource management and institutional learning at different 
governance levels. Moreover, institutional processes to establish rules and public 
regulations can be rendered more inclusive and open. External measures can address 
institutional decision-making and participation as well as the distribution of 
burdens and benefits (Walklate et al. 2013). 
4.2.2 Implications for Case Study Templates 
Hypotheses: 
Societies are more likely to manage opportunities and contain risks 
emanating from ALS/CO if institutions: 
(i) provide opportunities for societal self-organization, and; 
(ii) are able to cooperate, and; 
(iii) are flexible. 
Institutional flexibility can take different forms, including: 
 Multi-level governance arrangements; 
 Built-in risk spreading mechanisms; 
 An ability to learn and innovate; 
 An ability to facilitate public discourse. 
Related issue areas/questions: 
 Which institutions provide goods and services, for whom, and at which 
governance levels? 
 Are mandates clear? Do overlaps in mandates exist? 
 Do (state) institutions have regulatory capacities to coordinate governance 
interventions by other actors and orchestrate complex governance tasks? 
 How does the institutional structure handle situations of change and 
uncertainty? 
 Can citizens express discontent with the governance system? 
 Does the institutional structure provide opportunities for societal self-
organization and public debate? 
After governance breakdown/violent conflict: 
 To what extent are institutions still functional? 
 Have external actors assumed governance provision in certain sectors/regions? 
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4.3 Legitimacy and Social Acceptance of Governors 
Legitimacy and social acceptance pertain to the question of whether governance 
actors and institutions are considered legitimate governors by the population. EU-
LISTCO defines the legitimacy of governors as “a given social group’s or population’s 
sense of obligation or willingness to accept their authority” (Börzel and Risse 2018: 
23); also a crucial condition for the effectiveness of governance. Perceptions of 
legitimacy can facilitate the support of key parts of the society and voluntary 
compliance with rules (Schmelzle 2015). If governance actors and institutions are not 
considered legitimate, order contestation becomes more likely and the enforcement 
of rules more costly (and potentially more repressive). 
In ALS/CO, resilient societies need to be able to undergo processes of adaptation and 
transition, voluntary compliance of key parts of the population with (new) rules and 
courses of action can facilitate the required change processes. Change cannot be 
implemented by coercive means alone. Actors who are considered legitimate 
governors can request compliance from the community at times of risk exposure 
and uncertainty in order to initiate and implement change processes (Risse and 
Stollenwerk 2018a). 
Legitimacy is a normatively grounded belief (Levi et al. 2009). It is not a 
characteristic a governance actor can claim but is attributed to a governor by others 
(Risse and Stollenwerk 2018a). Legitimacy beliefs do not necessarily correlate with 
positive experiences and social trust. A governor who is endowed with legitimacy 
(e.g., a traditional leader by birth right) does not necessarily always have to comport 
in a fair, transparent, and inclusive manner for his or her claim to the right to rule to 
be accepted by the community (Black 2008). 
Hence, legitimacy beliefs are more robust and persistent than social trust. While 
social trust can be easily disappointed by negative experiences of cooperation, 
legitimacy perceptions might erode gradually or after a delay. In ALS/CO, social trust 
within groups might be very strong but the legitimacy of (state) institutions 
comparatively weak. Therefore, social trust and perceptions of who can legitimately 
govern can diverge and need to be explored in a context-specific manner in the case 
studies. 
4.3.1 Strengthening Legitimacy and Social Acceptance 
External actors can impact the sources of certain governors’ legitimacy by 
reinforcing their output legitimacy (effectiveness), input/throughput legitimacy 
(inclusive institutional arrangements, participation), or traditional/charismatic 
authority (leadership training). However, influencing legitimacy perceptions is not 
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only challenging for external actors but can also become normatively questionable 
(Eickhoff and Müller 2017). This means that legitimacy perceptions may be more of a 
precondition (though an important one) than an angle for external actors to actively 
strengthen resilience in a society. 
4.3.2 Implications for Case Study Templates 
Hypothesis: 
Societies are more likely to manage opportunities and contain risks 
emanating from ALS/CO if governance actors enjoy high levels of legitimacy. 
Related issue areas/questions: 
 To what extent do citizens perceive governance arrangements as legitimate? 
 Who do local elites consider to be legitimate governors? 
 Is the political/social order or the governance system challenged? How and by 
whom? 
 How is dissent to the right to rule expressed? Do civic uprisings/demonstrations 
take place? 
 Do (violent) actors seek to establish alternative modes of justice/security? Are 
they considered legitimate governors by parts of the society? 
After governance breakdown/violent conflict:  
 Does the population hold grievances against governance actors – e.g., the 
government/security forces/militias? 
4.4 Material Factors and Resources  
Material factors like natural assets and human capital are very important 
components of societies’ potential to manage opportunities and contain risks arising 
from ALS/CO. Such risks can engender costs and development deficits and require 
resources to manage and transform into opportunities. As Norris et al. (2008: 143) 
note, “communities must develop economic resources, reduce risk and resource 
inequities, and attend to their areas of greatest social vulnerability”. 
While natural resources and their distribution play an important role (i.e., in 
public/private revenue and/or external influence on extraction/exploitation), the 
availability of livelihood strategies, access to productive assets, and the diversity of 
options for income generation are also particularly important for societal resilience. 
In sum, a community is more resilient when it has a wide variety of economic 
opportunities (Bahadur et al. 2010). In ALS/CO, where non-state actors such as self-
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help groups, civil society, traditional authorities, and private companies play an 
important role in governance provision, these opportunities do not have to be 
provided and regulated by state institutions. As Bernier and Meinzen-Dick (2014: 4) 
note: 
Collective‐action institutions, such as producer organizations, can effectively 
allow members not only to share risk but also to diversify income, access new 
markets, and learn new skills and technologies, all of which have important 
implications for building diversity into social systems. 
4.4.1 Strengthening Resilience through Material Factors and 
Resources 
External actors can influence the availability of resources – e.g., by making external 
resources and assets available to communities and by building or rehabilitating 
domestic infrastructure (Bernier and Meinzen-Dick 2014). However, the 
interconnectedness of vulnerabilities and resilience within a society needs to be 
accounted for. For example, while the delivery of weapons to one community may 
increase the resilience of this community to manage specific security-related risks in 
ALS/CO, this measure might greatly increase the vulnerability and/or level of risk 
for neighbouring communities. 
As factors in societies’ capacities for self-reliance, domestic resources and assets are 
more pertinent access points for strengthening resilience. Measures can aim at 
increasing economic diversification, poverty reduction, and financial services 
availability for large parts of the society (Carabine and Wilkinson 2016). 
4.4.2 Implications for Case Study Templates 
Hypothesis: 
Societies are more likely to manage opportunities and contain risks 
emanating from ALS/CO if a variety of economic opportunities are available. 
Related issue areas/questions: 
 How diverse is the domestic economy? Is it integrated into a regional/global 
market? 
 Are financial services available and to which parts of the society? 
 Which vulnerabilities are most prevalent in the society, and which parts of the 
society are most affected? Do vulnerabilities threaten people’s livelihoods/ 
survival? 
 Which social, economic, and professional associations exist in the society? 
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 Can members of the society migrate to find livelihoods? 
 How are natural resources controlled (publicly/privately)? 
 Are resources provided by external actors? To whom are these resources 
provided and with what agenda (e.g., regime preservation/change)? 
 Is basic infrastructure (e.g., roads, airports, administration) in place that allows 
for non-state actors such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)/civil society actors 
to provide services? 
 Does the level of violence/crime allow non-state actors such as PPPs/ 
international organizations to provide services? 
 Are technologies perceived as risks or opportunities? What is the potential for 
technological innovation in the society? 
 Are property/land rights clearly regulated and agreed on (see Davis 2012)? 
After governance breakdown/violent conflict: 
 Is critical infrastructure still in place? 
 Do violent conflict parties retain means of coercion? Do they autonomously 
control social and political activities in certain regions? 
5.   RESEARCHING CONDITIONS FOR STRENGTHENING 
RESILIENCE IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD 
The SN – i.e., countries neighbouring the EU in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) – is often considered a very unstable region that presents numerous 
challenges to Europe’s political preparedness, ranging from radicalization and 
violence to migration and socio-economic issues. The political contestations from 
2011 in, for example, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Yemen have revealed the 
longstanding relations – and their tensions – between state, non-state, and external 
actors in those countries. On the one hand, these uprisings not only triggered 
multiple processes of governance breakdown (e.g., in Egypt and Tunisia) but also 
developed into civil and proxy wars (e.g., in Syria, Libya, and Yemen), resulting in an 
regional increase in ALS (Börzel and Risse 2018). Those dynamics also produced new 
forms of governance in which non-state, local, and external actors (Collombier et al. 
2016) have begun to occupy a central place. In this context, determining the 
conditions in which resilience can be strengthened is of utmost importance and 
presents interrelated analytical challenges. 
5.1 Contextualizing Resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood 
There are two main interrelated challenges that arise in contextualizing the theme of 
resilience in the SN. The first concerns how to translate the word ‘resilience’ into 
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Arabic, the closest equivalents being muruna (malleability) or takayyuf (adaptation), 
which refer to ‘a capacity to adapt’, while the UN literature in Arabic (FAO 2019; UN-
Habitat 2019) translates resilience as ‘the capacity to face crises’. The second entails 
the applicability of such a concept to the historical specificities of the region. For 
many years, scholars associated the concept of resilience with authoritarianism, 
using it to describe the political robustness of regimes to maintain their grip on 
power despite domestic and internal pressures (Bellin 2012; Heydemann and 
Leenders 2013). More recently, the concept of resilience has become associated with 
political resistance and quotidian survival in the face of adverse and oppressive 
structures of power (Capasso 2018) ‒ e.g., the long-standing Palestinian tradition of 
sumud (endurance) (Hage 2013; Meari 2014; Ryan 2015) towards Israeli occupation. 
This view of resilience as a capacity to escape and challenge the regulative forces of 
control highlights people’s ‘resilient as resistant’ capacities to get by and manoeuvre 
the yoke of authoritarian ‘resilience’.  Therefore, resilience not only varies according 
to the final objective (to what?) but also relates to the range of actors (of what?) that 
shape the political dynamics of societies in the SN. 
5.1.1 Resilience of What: Political and Social Conditions 
EU LISTCO focuses on societal resilience as a pre-condition for effective governance 
arrangements that provide goods and services to the society. When seeking to 
understand resilience and ALS/CO in the SN context, however, it is essential to take 
into account the historical and political specificities of the region; in particular, to 
grasp the interconnectedness of the multiple and diverse domestic actors that 
constitute the local societal dynamics of SN countries and external factors and actors 
that shape governance practices in the MENA region.  
The protests in 2011 shed light not only on the failure of Arab regimes to guarantee a 
pluralist and inclusive democracy, but – more importantly – on the challenging 
socio-economic conditions that characterised people’s lives. The increasing 
repression and corruption (Hibou 2011; Khalili and Schwedler 2010), coupled with 
three decades of neoliberal reforms in the Arab world, have complicated the picture 
of a simple dichotomy between the ‘Arab people’ and the ‘regime’ (Guazzone and 
Pioppi 2009). The changes of the last 30 years in many MENA countries reflect a 
“profound shift from (some form of) state-developmentalism toward intrinsically 
authoritarian modalities of neoliberal government” (Bogaert 2013: 215). The interests 
of ruling domestic elites and (global) economic elites have become increasingly 
intertwined (Kadri 2016) and paved the way for more authoritarian repression. For 
instance, neoliberal reforms have prompted Egyptian elites to increasingly rely on 
force as a guarantee of wealth accumulation, leading to an inevitable expansion in 
both the size and the remit of the state security apparatus (Abdelrahman 2016). At the 
Researching Resilience: Implications for Case Studies in Europe’s Neighbourhoods  
David Cadier, Matteo Capasso, and Karoline Eickhoff 
 
 
EU-LISTCO Working Paper No. 5/January 2020 
https://www.eu-listco.net/ 
 
 
21 
 
same time, however, it was the increasing reliance on violence to supress societal 
grievances that helped create a focus for mobilization and widespread protest. 
Such interconnectedness means that the roles of local actors – whether state or non-
state – in societal resilience cannot be divorced from that of external ones. In fact, it 
is likely that the higher the level of interconnectedness among local and external 
actors, the more difficult will be the task of identifying local resilience for 
researchers. Nevertheless, research could focus on identifying indicators for two 
interrelated phenomena: firstly, how the roles of and connections among different 
actors (e.g., leaders, tribes, religious figures, militias, external actors) affect resilience 
in society; and secondly, whether any common goal and vision (e.g., violence, 
resources, ending conflict, reconciliation) prompts the different actors to be resilient. 
This focus on both actors and goals might help to capture the conditions that allow 
resilience to emerge, suggest the forms it might take, and identify opportunities for 
the EU to foster it. 
5.1.2 Resilience to What: Risks Emanating from ALS/CO 
In the SN, ALS arise due to violent conflicts (e.g., in Libya, Syria, Yemen) where 
central governments have undergone a complete fragmentation, or there is ongoing 
– though less violent – CO (e.g., in Egypt, Tunisia) due to which the state is partly 
unable to deliver public goods and provide security. In both cases, risks emanate 
from the possibility of governance breakdown that not only fosters increasing 
internecine violence but also provides opportunities for external powers to interfere 
and exercise further influence (Blumi 2018; Mezran and Miller 2017; Phillips 2016). In 
other words, risks emerge both internally, from the power struggle between diverse 
local actors, and externally, as different foreign powers compete for regional 
hegemony. In such cases, local conflicts can easily turn into proxy wars (as in Libya 
and Syria), and it becomes necessary to disentangle the levels of interconnectedness 
and involvement of each actor on the ground. 
These internal and external aspects of CO are more likely to escalate into security 
crises when they are combined and mutually reinforcing. For instance, intra-state 
cooperation and/or contestations between external actors are clearly contributing to 
the ongoing crisis in legitimacy in SN countries. In the cases of Libya and Syria, for 
instance, the lack of public consent for the Qaddafi and Assad regimes and the 
weakness of state structures have been decisive contextual factors. The protests 
against those regimes were tipping points that offered opportunities for external 
actors to exercise influence in the region. In both cases, international and regional 
powers (Kamrava 2011) continue to finance and support different groups, bringing 
about a geo-economic and geopolitical conflict.  
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Identifying what makes resilience possible in such contexts requires unpacking all 
the internal and external aspects of CO in the empirical analysis, considering both 
domestic dynamics and the international sphere. Likewise, strengthening resilience 
means operating at different levels. It requires understanding how external actors’ 
involvement influences the resilience of local actors and how the latter, in turn, use 
those dynamics to maintain their power at the local level (Dannreuther 2015; Huber 
2015). 
Hypotheses: 
Internal and external CO are more likely to escalate into governance 
breakdown and violent conflict when they reinforce one another. 
ALS in the SN are less likely to escalate into governance breakdown when 
external actors do not intervene competitively.  
5.2 Strengthening Resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood 
5.2.1 Social Trust 
An analysis of social trust is important in understanding the capacities of the 
different communities in the SN to react to challenges of ALS, and thereby provide 
access to goods and services, as well as public order. The cases of Egypt and Libya, for 
instance, highlight how social trust can change according to the developing political 
conditions, thus affecting patterns of resilience. After the withdrawal of security 
forces in 2011, different groups of Egyptians came together regardless of their 
political views and established neighbourhood popular committees (El-Meehy 2012) 
as a means to help and sustain each other. In the aftermath of the elections, which 
took place two years later, clashes erupted between supporters of the ruling party, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and those opposing its views. Because of those clashes, the 
military justified its intervention and returned to power. Similarly, in Libya, during 
the eight-month NATO-led civil war against the al-Jamahiriyah regime (O’Sullivan 
2018), the ‘rebels’ showed a great degree of security coordination and military 
collaboration aimed at defeating and deposing the ‘regime’. Once that goal was 
achieved, the rebels fragmented into armed groups (militias) that not only lacked 
coordination but also started to operate with impunity inside the country. Foreign 
interference escalated further governance breakdown by supporting and funding 
different militias. 
Those experiences prompt a question: what are those forces at play that influence the 
changing patterns of trust? Social trust did not simply vary over time, but the 
ongoing struggles over resources and power directly affected its consistency. The 
establishment of Shia militias in Iraq or Christian militias in Syria, for instance, have 
shown how such decisions can undermine social trust among different groups in 
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societies. This also suggests that violence, or its unfolding possibilities, often 
produce a climate of fear and suspicion that is ultimately detrimental to cooperation 
and trust. Similarly, external factors can also contribute to undermining social trust 
via foreign military interventions, as happened in Libya in 2011. When the use of 
violence is validated as a means to practice politics, such actions can have important 
reverberations and consequences for social trust at the local and international levels, 
as well as between them (Davidson 2017; Henriksen and Larssen 2016). At the same 
time, the long-term effects of violence, if shared across a large community, can also 
create possibilities for fostering social trust and give birth to unexpected bonds and 
solidarities among people. The case of the Abu Salim prison massacre is an 
emblematic example which shows how families found the courage to contest the 
regime through their constant enquiries about the fate of their relatives (Zarrugh 
2018). 
Another important component is the level of inter-personal trust among members of 
a given social group. This dynamic is reflected in, for example, the case of Church 
support for the former regimes in Egypt and Syria. In Libya, tribal leaders have often 
intervened to de-escalate the violence between different militias and communities 
(Alunni et al. 2017), fostering cooperation between different groups and promoting 
reconciliation (Al-Zubayr 2017; Fraihat 2016). In those cases, the political stance of key 
figures affected social trust in opposite ways, suggesting how the political conditions 
and actors’ goals also contribute to the outcome. Studies on resilience in ALS have 
also shown that values like faith, family unity, morals and honour often serve as 
bedrock for resilience (Bruck et al. 2018; Eggerman and Panter-Brick 2010). The role 
of women in fostering trust and cooperation in households, as well as among diverse 
social groups, may be a significant one. Research has shown that women can help the 
promotion of effective governance, cooperation, and trust-based relationships 
(Fraihat 2016); yet, this requires acknowledging “the existing resilience that women 
already use or have used, and planning to bolster reserves to ensure that resilience is 
boosted in future” (Smyth and Sweetman 2015: 408). 
To locate how social trust can be fostered among different communities/actors in 
ALS, it is necessary to grasp the common goals and political vision that can bring 
different actors together and increase cooperation between them in the long-term. 
Hypotheses: 
The higher the level of societal trust, the less likely a given social group will 
take up arms and resort to violence. 
ALS in the SN are more likely to be resilient when senior political figures 
make decisions aimed at reducing the polarization of society. 
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5.2.2 Institutional Design 
While local institutions can be analysed as an important source of resilience, the 
level of interaction and interconnectedness between local and global actors must also 
be considered. The 2011 wave of popular uprisings triggered a process of re-defining 
the ‘social contract’ in the SN, shaking the region’s institutional designs to the core 
and prompting a search for an institutional model able to contain those tensions; a 
gargantuan effort hampered by the severe fragmentation if not complete paralysis 
of institutions resulting from the subsequent conflicts and violence. The protests 
also revealed that IMF-led structural adjustment policies and neoliberal reforms 
have contributed to the empowerment of rent-seeking elites (Kadri 2016) that, in 
turn, have worsened socio-economic inequalities and the marginalization and rising 
unemployment of young people (Abbott et al. 2018). The case of Tunisia is 
emblematic because “local and global political structures impose[d] their 
constructions of youth as ways to subordinate and control young workers and defuse 
resistance” (Murphy 2015: 689). Egypt also continues to suffer from similar problems 
(Sika 2016, 2018; Springborg 2016). For Tunisia, this has created regional economic 
inequalities that have contributed to profound CO and – at times – radicalization 
(Fahmi and Meddeb 2015). 
More cooperation between actors, however, does not necessarily translate into an 
effective institutional design. In Libya, there are numerous examples of 
collaboration among militias and international actors to improve security and curb 
migration (Gallieni 2017). While these arrangements have proven effective in 
providing basic services and access to goods to the local population, they also 
continue to benefit and profit from human trafficking and weapons smuggling (Al-
Arabi 2018). Numerous parts of Libya have witnessed the rise of a hybrid security 
sector where informal non-state actors (e.g., militias, Salafi-groups) now provide 
security to the local communities and are slowly fragmenting the state’s Weberian 
monopoly on violence (Wehrey 2017). While those arrangements provide answers to 
day-to-day problems, it is difficult to envision how such hybridity can be sustainable 
in the long-term due to the fragility and unpredictability of alliances among the 
groups (Krieg 2017). 
Hypothesis: 
The risk of ALS/CO escalating into governance breakdown and violent 
conflict is greater in states and societies where local networks and rent-
seeking elites capture state institutions and monopolize economic resources.  
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Empirical Questions: 
 What institutional designs are resilient enough to solve the day-to-day problems 
of members of the society? 
 Could processes of decentralization (or federalism) also offer an alternative and 
effective and resilient form of governance? 
 Could a more resilient institutional design emerge through a closer collaboration 
between international financial institutions and local actors, such as youth? 
5.2.3 Legitimacy 
All of the 2011 protests in the SN radically contested the legitimacy of incumbent 
regimes, demanding that rulers (and their affiliates) step down and renounce power. 
Considering the high levels of repression and securitization in the affected countries, 
the regimes appeared to have relied primarily on the use of force to impose their 
legitimacy. However, local dynamics were not the only source of legitimacy 
(Sedgwick 2010), which had become an ambiguous and contested terrain (von 
Billerbeck and Gippert 2017). External actors had historically contributed to this 
process, and during the 2011 protests they played an important role, intervening 
militarily in some contexts while standing by in others. The main task, therefore, is 
to understand the main sources, values, and constituencies of actors’ legitimacy 
(Schlumberger 2010). 
The sources of legitimacy actors rely on in order to claim a certain entitlement to 
authority and to mobilize people in support of that claim may include religion 
(Piscatori and Eickelman 2004; Volpi 2009), nationalism (Dawisha 2003) identity-
politics (Saouli 2015), traditional values, or, more broadly, ideological discourses 
(Weeden 1999). Legitimacy perceptions may also be influenced (Carpi and Glioti 2018) 
by, for instance, violence (Weigand 2017), corruption, informal economies (Hanau-
Santini 2018), and/or the provision of goods (Martinez and Eng 2017, 2018). In areas of 
prolonged conflict (e.g., Syria, Libya, and Yemen), while military control of territories 
remains a key element in the survival/resilience of state and non-state actors, 
mechanisms of co-optation and nepotism also allow certain elites/intermediaries to 
maintain or consolidate power. Understanding how actors gain legitimacy can help 
determine the long-term sustainability and resilience of their strategies. 
Hypotheses: 
The more equal the provision of goods and access to resources, the higher will 
be the perceived legitimacy of central governments.  
The higher the level of co-optation of local elites by central governments, the 
higher will be the legitimacy of state institutions. 
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Empirical Questions: 
 What mechanisms are employed by international, state, and non-state actors to 
maintain legitimacy perceptions? How does international recognition affect 
state and non-state actors’ legitimacy? 
 How do actors convey the content of their sources of legitimacy? What are their 
modes of communication and practices? 
5.2.4 Material Factors and Resources 
Socio-economic factors lay at the core of the 2011 protests (Abbott et al. 2018). Until 
2011, however, economic indicators continued to show the Arab region making 
steady progress in terms of the World Bank’s twin goals of eliminating extreme 
poverty and boosting shared prosperity (Kadri 2016). The indicators missed the 
growing popular dissatisfaction with the quality of government services, including 
lack of job opportunities in the formal sector, unavailability of affordable housing, 
poor quality public services, and the lack of government accountability 
(Ianchovichina et al. 2015). Three decades of neoliberal policies had also quietly 
contributed to the progressive deterioration of economic conditions in the MENA 
region (Bogaert 2013; Hinnebusch 2015). An analysis of these material factors and 
resource distributions can help us understand resilience vis-à-vis larger political 
processes. 
Resilience might be fostered by local attempts to diversify the economy and make 
people more reliant on endogenous agricultural and industrial activities as well as by 
existing aid programs. In Libya, for instance, the absence of a clear legislative 
framework regulating land-rights and properties (Fitzgerald and Megerisi 2015) 
might be an impediment to both effective governance and social resilience. In 
contrast, the EU’s decision to lift taxes on the import of Tunisian olive oil (Ghamni 
2016) may help boost the local economy. Such decisions, however, require a clear 
understanding of the political specificities of those countries and need to be 
undertaken in a spirit of reciprocity (Bicchi 2014). Economic and material factors are 
also directly relevant to understanding CO dynamics and effects. The presence of 
professional associations (e.g., trade unions) positively affects the resilience of 
societies in the SN. For instance, the strong tradition of workers’ movements in 
Tunisia allowed the country to experience a less violent transition from the former 
regime to the present one (Allinson 2015). This, however, does not suggest divorcing 
the political economy of the Arab world from that of the rest of the world. Rather, as 
Hanieh (2014, 2018) also argues, it remains crucial to understand how the movement 
of capital beyond its national boundaries affects people’s everyday lives. 
Material factors and resources also relate to external configurations of CO, both as a 
lever in contestation/competition between orders and as a variable mediating the 
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risk of these contests escalating into conflict. In Libya, the UN has documented how 
armed groups across the country have built their military forces through the support 
of foreign countries (United Nations 2017). Nowadays, many local militias rely 
heavily on the circulation of weapons for financial sustainability. The smuggling of 
weapons has consequently spread to many surrounding countries – from Syria to 
Mali – through black market sales to terrorist groups, insurgents, and other criminal 
entities. This in turn incites clashes and governance breakdowns (Strazzari and 
Zampagni 2018), prolonging unhealthy and violent dynamics in the SN. In such 
cases, it might be worth investigating whether attempts to disarm people can be 
fostered at the local level. 
Hypotheses: 
Societies will be more able to cope with the risks of conflict and governance 
breakdown emanating from ALS/CO:  
(i) the more diversified the economy, and  
(ii) where profit is not generated from economic activities related to 
conflict dynamics. 
Empirical Questions: 
 How can domestic resources and economics be fostered as sources of resilience?  
 Does external support (with money and weapons) contribute to turning violence 
into a key element of economic and political practices, and if so, how? 
 To what extent does the provision of funds and arms lower resilience and 
contribute to the production of structural inequalities (Duffield 2007; CADTM 
2018)? 
6.  RESEARCHING CONDITIONS FOR STRENGTHENING 
RESILIENCE IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD 
The EN – i.e., the six countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – is generally considered more resilient than 
the SN (Gaub and Popescu 2017: 93). Nevertheless, as the Ukraine crisis dramatically 
demonstrated, the intersection in the region of dysfunctional governance and 
external geopolitical pressure has the potential to escalate ALS and CO into 
governance breakdowns and violent conflicts. Policy debates on strengthening 
resilience in the EN tend, however, to focus overly on proofing its political and 
economic systems from external influence (namely that of Russia). While this is 
certainly crucial given Russia’s role in sponsoring both ALS and CO in the region, 
such a focus tends to overlook important aspects of state and societal resilience as 
well as to disregard the agency of local actors in bringing about reforms. Thus, there 
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is a need for deeper empirical inquiry into the conditions for strengthening 
resilience in the EN – i.e., both its current level and the specific factors and actors 
likely to increase it. 
6.1 Contextualizing Resilience in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
Following EU-LISTCO’s understanding of resilience – which, as emphasised above, is 
based on the EUGS – analysing the conditions in which resilience can be fostered in 
the EN implies characterizing the types of ‘internal and external crisis’ with which 
states and societies of the region are confronted and identifying the factors affecting 
their ‘abilities to reform’. 
6.1.1 Resilience to What: Risks Emanating from ALS/CO 
In the EN, the clearest ALS are the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’; a contested term for de 
facto independent territories that are disputed or that have broken away from the 
state, often along ethno-cultural lines, and as a consequence of the collapse of the 
USSR (Bebler 2015; Dembinska and Campana 2017; Lynch 2002; O’Loughlin, Kolossov, 
and Toal 2014).1 In affected states, central governments are unable to deliver public 
goods or implement rules in these territories and do not control the means of 
violence, while the separatists generally receive military and economic support from 
Russia. Every state in the region but Belarus is affected by or involved in at least one 
such conflict. Several authors have described these territories as governance ‘black 
holes’, where levels of corruption, smuggling, and poverty run particularly high 
(Cornell 2017; De Waal 2018c). In studying the conditions under which these low-
intensity territorial conflicts are likely to escalate into high-intensity conflicts or 
inter-state war, experts point to dynamics of internal security dilemmas and to 
political decisions taken in this context (Welt 2010).2 Thus, fostering resilience 
against the risks and negative externalities flowing from these territorial conflicts 
implies supporting external and local governance providers (i.e., other than the 
central states) and developing economic and societal links with the break-away 
territories (De Waal 2018a) while also seeking to defuse internal security dilemmas. 
                                               
1
  The term ‘frozen conflict’ is disputed as these conflicts are far from dormant and some continue to 
generate human casualties. 
2
  In the case of the Russo-Georgia war, for instance, it was the decision of the Saakashvili 
government to attack Tsinvali on the 7th of August 2008, and Moscow’s orchestrated provocations 
before – and disproportionate military reaction to – the attack, that led the frozen conflict in South 
Ossetia to escalate into an inter-state war (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia 2009; Kofman 2018; Toal 2017). 
 
Researching Resilience: Implications for Case Studies in Europe’s Neighbourhoods  
David Cadier, Matteo Capasso, and Karoline Eickhoff 
 
 
EU-LISTCO Working Paper No. 5/January 2020 
https://www.eu-listco.net/ 
 
 
29 
 
Hypotheses:  
ALS are less likely to escalate into violent conflict when:  
(i) populations of the break-away region maintain societal, economic and 
cultural links with those of the central state, and; 
(ii) internal and external security dilemmas are low. 
In the EN, risks emanating from CO pertain, internally, to struggles among rent-
seeking elites or between these elites and societies demanding accountability and, 
externally, to the region-building (or structural power) competition between the EU 
and Russia. The former dynamic has caused several political crises to escalate into 
mass civil unrest, sometimes qualified as ‘colour revolutions’ (Finkel and Brudny 
2012; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Stewart 2009). The latter has exacerbated 
internal polarizations in the countries concerned and prompted coercive actions on 
the part of Russia (Cadier 2015). While these internal and external CO are more likely 
to escalate into security crises when combined and mutually reinforcing, the 
respective dynamics, impacts, and pre-eminence of the internal and external aspects 
of CO need to be distinguished and untangled in the empirical analysis. In the case of 
the Ukraine conflict, for instance, the lack of public consent for the Yanukovych 
regime and the weakness of Ukraine’s state structures were decisive contextual 
factors. On the one hand, the fall of the Yanukovych regime was a tipping point that 
prompted Russia’s military intervention in Crimea and the Donbas and caused EU-
Russia geo-economic competition to escalate into a geopolitical conflict (Allison 2014; 
Cadier 2014). On the other, both the security and governance vacuum opened by the 
collapse of the Party of Region’s power structures in the East and the degenerating 
and corrupt state of Ukraine’s security apparatus (i.e., the intelligence services, the 
army) have allowed pro-Russian networks and agents to escalate local opposition to 
the Maidan protests into armed rebellion (Toal 2017). Hence, strengthening resilience 
in such a context would have meant reinforcing consent to public order as well as 
state (or governance) structures. Yet a focus on geopolitical competition has, at times, 
led the EU and its member states to misread domestic political upheaval and even 
take measures detrimental to resilience (Cadier 2019) – as when the EU seemed ready 
to lower its governance reform standards to lock in the Yanukovych government and 
avoid it turning to Russia (Youngs 2017). 
Hypotheses: 
Situations of internal and external CO are more likely to escalate into 
governance breakdown and violent conflict when:  
(i) internal and external dynamics reinforce one another;  
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(ii) consent to public order is low, and;  
(iii) state and governance structures are weak. 
6.1.2 Resilience of What: Political and Social Conditions 
Most of the countries of the EN ‒ i.e., Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, to a lesser 
extent, Armenia ‒ can be described as ‘hybrid political regimes’, while Belarus and 
Azerbaijan can be characterised as autocratic states (Gaub and Popescu 2015). Hybrid 
political regimes generally combine democratic constitutional arrangements and 
competitive political processes with non-democratic governance practices (Diamond 
2002; Knott 2018; Levitsky and Way 2010; Stewart et al. 2013). In the EN, such regimes 
tend to limit citizens’ access to political and economic resources (Ademmer et al. 
2018) and to feed societies’ distrust of regular politics’ ability to deliver better 
governance. Over the last two decades, this has led domestic political struggles to 
escalate into mass protests and civil unrest; in Georgia in 2003 and 2007, in Ukraine 
in 2004 and 2014, in Moldova in 2009, and in Armenia in 2017.3 State capture, 
economic oligarchy, and endemic corruption have been central features of hybrid 
political regimes in the EN, and key factors both in impeding democratic governance 
and in feeding citizens’ grievances against the public order. 
Empirical questions: 
 How can societal resilience be strengthened under hybrid political regimes? 
 How does state capture affect states and societies’ abilities to reform? 
To strengthen resilience and foster desirable social and political conditions in the 
EN, external actors can support and encourage states and societies’ abilities to 
reform. Academic studies generally focus on the contextual factors favouring or 
impeding reforms, emphasizing the role of local elites’ preferences, calculations, and 
strategies in driving policy change and in responding to external stimuli (Ademmer 
et al. 2016; Langbein and Börzel 2015; Lavenex 2014; Tolstrup 2014). By contrast, they 
find little correlation between governance reforms and either levels of democracy or 
EU integration prospects (Gaub and Popescu 2015; Langbein and Börzel 2013). 
Regarding democracy, a frequently cited example is Georgia under Saakashvili, 
which conducted its most successful public policy reforms at a time where the 
executive had accumulated power beyond democratic standards (Nodia 2018). 
Regarding EU integration, a key case is Armenia, which responded favourably to EU 
                                               
3
  Experts tend to characterize new domestic political crises of this kind as “inevitable” and at risk of 
becoming “more violent” (see Gaub and Popescu 2015: 42). 
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stimuli for sectoral reforms in several issue areas despite its membership of the 
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015). Finally, the 
impact of Russia’s actions and influence on governance reforms is not completely 
clear: it has hampered reforms in some instances but  favoured them in others, albeit 
indirectly (Ademmer 2016; Ademmer and Börzel 2013; Langbein 2013; Tolstrup 2014). 
Hypothesis: 
External actors are more likely to be successful in pushing for governance 
reforms when policy or institutional change fit the political calculations of 
gate-keeping elites. 
Empirical question: 
 What are the effects of Russia’s actions and influence on governance reforms? 
Societal resilience more broadly is likely to be contingent on social cohesion and the 
management of salient ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages. In the EN, such 
cleavages are mainly apparent in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. The intervention of 
external actors (Russia first and foremost) and certain domestic political decisions 
have contributed to exacerbating tensions, leading to structural polarizations and, at 
times, CO. Some of the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ partly reflect ethnic divisions (e.g., 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia) though not all do (O’Loughlin et al. 2014). For instance, 
Gagauz separatism is based on ethnic claims while Transnistrian separatism is not 
(Parmentier 2014). Yet, it is Transnistria that seceded from Moldova’s central state 
(becoming an ALS) while the Gagauz minority negotiated autonomy within the state 
of Moldova. The region-building competition between Russia and the EU has 
foregrounded these internal divisions, with the two aforementioned Moldovan 
provinces declared themselves in favour of joining the EEU while the central 
government in Chisinau was pursuing an Association Agreement with the EU 
(Parmentier 2014). It should also be noted that breakaway regions in the EN are 
themselves rarely homogenous: Abkhazia and Transnistria are, for instance, 
ethnically and culturally diverse. Similarly, in the conflict-torn Donbas, “mixed 
Ukrainian-Russian identities are significant and counterbalance ethnification and 
polarization induced by the war” (Sasse 2017: 1). 
In Ukraine and several other EN countries, polarizations have crystalized less around 
ethnicity that around language. Empirical studies investigating the role of ethnic 
identity in shaping attitudes and affecting societal resilience should therefore 
distinguish the following four elements: individual language preference, language 
embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality (Onuch and Hale 2018). The 
ongoing conflict in Ukraine has had a differentiated effect on these various 
components: a study on the Donbas finds, for instance, that the self-reported 
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polarization of identities has been accompanied by a preservation of civic identities 
and that the strengthening of Ukrainian ethno-linguistic identification does not 
necessarily lead to abandoning bilingual practices (Sasse and Lackner 2018). By 
contrast, in the rest of Ukraine, the conflict in the Donbas has impacted the local 
population’s ethnolinguistic identifications, language use, and language policy 
preferences (Kulyk 2018), and certain legislative acts passed (or under consideration) 
by the central government have contributed to the “securitization of the language 
issue” (Sasse 2018). 
Hypothesis: 
The higher the polarizations around ethno-linguistic identifications and 
language practices in ALS, the lower will be the social cohesion and societal 
resilience. 
Empirical question: 
 How does the securitization of language issues affect state resilience in the post-
Soviet space? 
In addition, case studies will need to review the potential of local actors in the EN to 
strengthen resilience, i.e., to assess whether and which actors beyond the state can 
serve as functional equivalents in providing public goods and services (e.g., religious 
leaders, companies, international organizations). In particular, understanding 
religious organizations’ potential to perform such functions in the EN requires 
unpacking their intertwinement with politics and nationalism. For instance, 
referring to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s (UOC) request to be granted 
autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and in the face of 
opposition by the Moscow Patriarchate, some analysts argue that “autocephaly is a 
double-edged sword in times of conflict”, and that it is “highly unlikely to deliver the 
peace-making effect on society” that many hope for (Elsner 2018). Others have 
pointed to the Georgian Orthodox Church’s support for the illiberal tendencies of the 
Ivanishvili government (Gordzadze 2014) or to the role the Russian Orthodox Church 
in Russia’s conservative foreign policy turn (Petro 2018). 
Empirical question: 
 Which local non-state actors show potential for resilience in the EN? 
6.2 Strengthening Resilience in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
6.2.1 Social Trust 
Social trust can be fostered by increasing horizontal and/or vertical trust (see 4.1.1). In 
the EN, societal cohesion (or lack thereof) affects horizontal trust while hybrid 
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political regimes and their corollaries in terms of governance practices undermine 
vertical trust. For external actors, strengthening social trust in the EN implies 
overcoming or at least defusing the negative externalities of these specific contexts. 
Comparing social trust levels in several post-Soviet countries over an interval of 10 
years, Sapsford et al. (2015) find a correlation between societal trust (or trust in 
people) and certain identifiable contextual factors. First, countries that are more 
successful economically – indexed here by GDP, growth rates, poverty levels, and 
perceptions of household economies – tend to display higher levels of social trust. 
Second, social trust tends to be lower in countries that score low on the following 
political indicators: perceptions of freedoms of speech, movement and association, 
trust in the institutions of control (courts, police, and army), satisfaction with how 
democracy is developing, and satisfaction with the action of the government. Third, 
countries with low social cohesion – i.e., with pronounced ethnic, cultural, and 
linguistic divisions and without a well-established set of norms and expectations 
about how the society will function – tend to display lower levels of social trust. 
Strengthening social trust in such contexts thus involves considering and addressing 
these economic, political, and societal conditions, while bearing in mind that it is less 
the actual conditions and more the citizens’ perceptions of them that matter. 
Hypotheses: 
The level of social trust will be higher where:  
(i)  a state is economically successful;  
(ii)  citizens have positive perceptions of freedoms and satisfaction with 
the action of the government, and;  
(iii) there are high levels of social cohesion. 
Empirical Questions: 
 How can horizontal trust be strengthened across ALS and the rest of the country? 
 How can societal cohesion be strengthened in the EN? 
6.2.2 Institutional Design 
In the EN, the design and functioning of political and governance institutions is 
largely tributary to the nature of political regimes (hybrid or autocratic) and to elite 
network dynamics (state capture and oligarchy). Hybrid political regimes in the EN 
combine formal democratic rule with authoritarian governance. While rule-making 
institutions generally allow for competitive political processes and open elections, 
they cannot be said to channel citizens’ voices in the political process in an efficient 
and negotiated manner. More than by programmatic politics, this process is 
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characterised in the EN by patronal politics – i.e., by the selective application of 
personalised material reward and coercion by hierarchical patronage networks (Hale 
2015). Constitutional structures and elections affect the management of political and 
economic resources, not by providing guiding principles or channelling citizens 
demands, but by affecting elites’ expectations about the future distribution of power 
(Hale 2015: 70–77). More generally, oligarchic networks tend to capture state 
institutions, monopolize economic resources, feed corruption patterns, and block 
reforms (Konończuk et al. 2018). They notably feed a partial reform equilibrium by 
“blocking further advances in reform that would correct the very distortions on 
which their initial gains were based” (Hellman 1998: 233). Thus, in the EN, informal 
practices and elites’ expectations and preferences condition institutional reforms 
and capacity development (Aliyev 2017) and thereby external actors’ abilities to 
strengthen that component of resilience. 
Hypotheses: 
The more oligarchic networks capture state institutions and monopolize 
economic resources:  
(i) the less flexibility institutions will have to adapt to changing 
conditions, and;  
(ii) the less external actors will be able to push for reforms towards 
flexible institutional design. 
Empirical Questions: 
 How can resilience and institutional designs be strengthened in a context where 
informal practices are important for household economies? 
 How do elite expectations affect institutional capacity development? 
6.2.3 Legitimacy 
The political and social conditions prevailing in the EN and described above affect 
the various aspects of governors’ legitimacy: patronal regime dynamics skew input 
legitimacy; state capture undermines throughput legitimacy; non-democratic 
governance characteristics and practices of hybrid political regimes weaken output 
legitimacy; and ethnic, cultural, and linguistic polarizations impact traditional 
legitimacy. 
Governors’ legitimacy deficits with regard to input, throughput, and output 
legitimacy have led to – and been expressed in – mass protests and civil unrest in the 
region. More than being about a (hypothetical) geopolitical choice between the EU 
and Russia, the 2014 Maidan revolts were about denouncing a corrupt and unfair 
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system (Onuch 2014), as were the Spring 2018 Armenia protests (De Waal 2018b). By 
contrast, traditional legitimacy deficits have fed – or been instrumentalized within – 
larger scale CO. Populations in the Donbas ‒ whether in the Kyiv-controlled parts or 
in the self-proclaimed DNR/LNR ‒ tend to express strong distrust of the Ukrainian 
President and the post-Maidan authorities more generally (Sasse 2017). This does not 
mean, however, that these populations trust the intervening power or support 
separatism as such; a majority of these populations – again from both sides of the 
frontline – favour remaining in Ukraine over integration into Russia (Sasse 2017). In 
the Kharkiv region, where the population had tended to look eastwards (whether in 
cultural, economic or geopolitical terms) and was highly distrustful of the Maidan 
movement and the post-Maidan authorities, legitimacy deficits have not escalated 
into major instability and violence, as the Kyiv central government managed to 
strike a deal with local elites regarded as legitimate by a majority of the population 
(Jarábik and Shapovalova 2018). The corollary of this political pact has been, however, 
that corrupt local practices have remained in place and that reforms have been 
forestalled. As such, in Ukraine, “decentralization reforms are not a cure for bad 
governance in the [current] national and local political context” (Jarábik and 
Shapovalova 2018). 
Hypotheses: 
In hybrid political regimes, patronal politics undermines input, throughput, 
and output legitimacy and the ability of external actors to strengthen it. 
The traditional legitimacy deficit of central governments is less likely to feed 
dynamics of governance breakdown and violent conflict when it is 
compensated by the traditional legitimacy of local elites. 
Empirical Question: 
 In the EN, do local elites tend to have more legitimacy than national elites? 
6.2.4 Material Factors and Resources 
In the EN, economic and material conditions are directly affected by the political and 
social contexts described above and, in particular, by state capture, oligarchic 
monopolies, pervasive corruption, and lack of structural reforms. EN countries tend 
to experience high levels of poverty and lack of economic diversification. Their 
markets are largely dysfunctional; states retain significant influence over business 
operations, and regulatory frameworks tend to change with governments. Overall, 
there is a “close link between political power and the control of industrial and 
financial assets” in EN countries (Charap and Colton 2017: 167).  
These local economic and material factors shape ALS in the EN in at least two ways. 
First, they influence conflict dynamics in the de facto states (or breakaway provinces) 
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and, as such, the risks of escalation and the prospects of resolution. In Transnistria, 
for instance, privatization processes involving actors from the patron state (i.e., 
Russia) tend to heighten tensions between the rent-seeking interests of the 
personalistic presidential power of the central state (i.e., Moldova) and that of new 
owners, and this tends to foster (local) elites’ defection (Balmaceda 2013). In addition, 
several criminal networks retain significant influence in these territories (Molcean 
and Verstandig 2014; Nilsson 2014), and the effects of this should be investigated 
empirically. As in the Yugoslav wars, these criminal networks tend to benefit from 
situations of ALS, while on-going conflicts often do not prevent even legal business 
transactions. For instance, Ukrainian firms continued to buy coal from the Donbas 
several years after the outbreak of the conflict, until the central government in Kyiv 
decided to outlaw trade with entities from these territories and to impose an 
economic blockade on the region (Varfolomeyev 2017), forcing Ukraine to increase 
coal imports from Russia. 
Second, economic and material conditions affect societal resilience in ALS/CO and 
beyond. In the countries of the EN, including the post-Soviet de facto states, social 
trust tends to be lower when poverty levels are high, growth rates are low, and 
perceptions of household economies are negative (Sapsford et al. 2015). The economic 
situation is particularly dire in Transnistria, for instance, especially after Russia 
reduced its subsidies to the province following the outbreak of the conflict in the 
Donbas and due to its own economic woes. In 2015, the separatist authorities were 
able to pay only 70% of public sector wages and pensions (EURACTIV 2017). Poor 
economic results are often a reflection of the fact that separatist authorities tend to 
sacrifice economic considerations to political objectives. In the case of the 
Transnistrian ruble, for instance, “the local leadership’s pride in having a local 
currency was made possible at the cost of economic crisis” (Isachenko 2009: 74). As 
such, external actors aiming to strengthen the economic and material components of 
resilience in ALS/CO will often involve circumventing local actors’ political 
objectives. 
Hypotheses: 
Societies are likely to be less able to cope with the risks of governance 
breakdown and/or conflict emanating from ALS/CO in situations where: 
(i) economic elites from the patron and central states are in direct 
competition over material and industrial resources, and;  
(ii) criminal networks generate profit from ALS/CO dynamics. 
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Empirical questions: 
 To what extent do economic and material factors mediate the risk of ALS/CO in 
the EN escalating into conflict? 
 How do the influence of criminal networks and the political objectives of 
separatist actors affect societal resilience in post-Soviet ALS/CO? 
Economic and material factors are also directly relevant to understanding the 
dynamics of internal and external CO, whether in terms of their modalities or effects. 
On the one hand, because of the peculiar nexus between economic power and 
political influence prevailing in countries of the EN, economic factors have played an 
important role in mediating the escalation of domestic political contestation into 
mass civil protest (the so-called ‘colour revolutions’) and have featured prominently 
in regimes’ counter-contestation strategies. In the context of these protests, 
mobilization should be understood less as a struggle between democracy and 
autocracy and more as “a struggle for power among groups with competing interests 
and differential resources” (Radnitz 2010: 143). Indeed, Radnitz shows that mass 
political contestation happened not in countries where populations were the most 
aggrieved economically but in those that had undergone reforms towards partially 
de-centralizing the concentration of resources and where a new capitalist class had 
thereby emerged. These new elites have played a key role in mobilizing and 
signalling mass discontent and in determining whether opposition protests succeed 
or fail. Stated differently, countries where some economic pluralism had prevailed 
since the 1990s and where the set of actors eligible to share state resources was wider 
(i.e., Georgia or Ukraine) have experienced mass protests leading to regime change, 
while countries where such pluralism was absent and where resources flew instead 
to a smaller group that was also running the government (i.e., Belarus or Azerbaijan) 
did not (Radnitz 2010). This is not to say that states with low economic pluralism are 
necessarily more stable, as there are other forms of political contestation than mass 
protests: in Azerbaijan, for instance, political transitions can be particularly perilous 
due to the risk of heightened factional in-fighting (Radnitz 2012). Rather, the point is 
to emphasize the role of domestic business elites in mediating domestic political 
contestation and societal resilience. Finally, economic and material factors also have 
impact on domestic political contestation where authoritarian governments mobilize 
them in their regime survival strategies (Fumagalli 2017). The Belarus regime, for 
instance, relies heavily on targeted distribution of social and monetary benefits 
(Finkel and Brudny 2012: 8). 
On the other hand, material factors and resources also relate to external 
configurations of CO, both in leveraging order contestation/competition and in 
mediating the risk of escalation into conflict. Russia’s military support to the Donbas 
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insurgents is a clear and extreme example of the former aspect. As regards the latter, 
the EU-Russia geo-economic or region-building competition and the decisions taken 
by Moscow and Brussels in that context have strained the resilience of countries of 
the EN to the extent that “financial infusions spurred by the Russia-West regional 
contest made it much easier for governing elites to postpone structural reform 
indefinitely” (Charap and Colton 2017: 172). 
Hypothesis: 
The more local elites instrumentalize mass discontent in their competition 
for a state’s material resources, the less societies will be able to cope with the 
risk of conflict emanating from internal CO. 
Empirical Questions: 
 How does economic pluralism mediate the effects of domestic CO? 
 How do business elite competition and regime factional in-fighting affect 
societal resilience? 
 How does EU-Russia geo-economic and region-building competition affect state 
and societal resilience in the EN? 
7. CONCLUSION 
When approaching the question of resilience in the EU’s neighbourhoods, it is 
fundamental to have a thorough grasp of the diverse actors that have constituted – 
and continue to constitute – the societal dynamics of those countries. This paper has 
shown that, when thinking through the categories of resilience that the ALS/CO 
conceptual framework provides, there are numerous commonalities between the EN 
and SN. For instance, strengthening social trust in both neighbourhoods often 
requires considering and addressing less the actual economic, political, and societal 
conditions than the citizens’ perceptions of them. Furthermore, political regimes in 
both neighbourhoods often combine formal democratic rule with authoritarian 
governance, where rule-making institutions generally allow for competitive political 
processes and open elections but cannot be said to channel citizens’ voices in the 
political process in an efficient and negotiated manner. What instead appears to 
characterize the institutional design of the neighbourhoods is the selective 
application of personalised material reward and coercion by hierarchical patronage 
networks. In such a situation, where oligarchic networks and armed groups capture 
state institutions and monopolize access to resources, societies appear to be less 
capable of developing healthy and long-term mechanisms of resilience. Similarly, in 
areas of prolonged conflict, like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, while military control of 
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territories remains a key element for the survival/resilience of some state and non-
state actors, mechanisms of co-optation and nepotism also allow certain 
elites/intermediaries to maintain or consolidate their power. Another similarity 
between the neighbourhoods is the key role of material resources/factors in 
resilience, as most EN and SN countries experience high levels of poverty, rising 
unemployment, and a lack of economic diversification. These insights suggest that, 
due to the close link between political power and the control of industrial and 
financial assets, the improvement of the economic conditions and the provision of 
incentives are key elements when seeking to promote societal resilience. 
The most important contribution of this paper adds to the conceptual framework is 
the focus on the role of international/external actors and how they contribute to both 
the emergence of ALS/CO as well as to resilience. Thus, while it is important to 
identify the historical and political specificities of those countries and regions, it 
should be remembered that ALS and CO interact with and are shaped by external 
factors. Understanding resilience, therefore, often requires thinking beyond 
domestic dynamics and into the international sphere and considering how external 
actors’ involvement influences the resilience of local actors and how the latter, in 
turn, use those dynamics to maintain their power at the local level. For instance, local 
actors searching for legitimacy can appeal to international ones while ignoring 
accountability to local constituencies. Hence, strengthening resilience in such 
situations can entail reinforcing both local and external governance structures, as 
these can be closely related. In addition, the focus on geopolitical competition has – 
at times – led the EU and its member states to misinterpret domestic political 
upheaval, resulting in the hasty formulation of measures that have been detrimental 
for resilience more broadly, as happened in Ukraine and Libya. 
Overall, we validate the applicability of EU-LISTCO’s conceptual framework (Börzel 
and Risse 2018) across the neighbourhoods. While a clear understanding of the 
political specificities of EN and SN countries is required, the EU should nevertheless 
aim to identify measures of resilience that can be undertaken in a spirit of 
reciprocity and mutual benefit. 
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